Coalition Games with Cooperative Transmission: A Cure for the Curse of
  Boundary Nodes in Selfish Packet-Forwarding Wireless Networks by Han, Zhu & Poor, H. Vincent
ar
X
iv
:0
70
4.
32
92
v2
  [
cs
.IT
]  
25
 A
pr
 20
07
Coalition Games with Cooperative Transmission: A Cure for the Curse of
Boundary Nodes in Selfish Packet-Forwarding Wireless Networks
Zhu Han∗ and H. Vincent Poor+
∗Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
Boise State University, Idaho, USA
+Department of Electrical Engineering,
Princeton University, New Jersey, USA
Abstract— In wireless packet-forwarding networks with selfish
nodes, applications of a repeated game can induce the nodes to
forward each others’ packets, so that the network performance
can be improved. However, the nodes on the boundary of such
networks cannot benefit from this strategy, as the other nodes
do not depend on them. This problem is sometimes known as
the curse of the boundary nodes. To overcome this problem, an
approach based on coalition games is proposed, in which the
boundary nodes can use cooperative transmission to help the
backbone nodes in the middle of the network. In return, the
backbone nodes are willing to forward the boundary nodes’
packets. The stability of the coalitions is studied using the
concept of a core. Then two types of fairness, namely, the min-
max fairness using nucleolus and the average fairness using the
Shapley function are investigated. Finally, a protocol is designed
using both repeated games and coalition games. Simulation
results show how boundary nodes and backbone nodes form
coalitions together according to different fairness criteria. The
proposed protocol can improve the network connectivity by about
50%, compared with pure repeated game schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless networks with selfish nodes such as ad hoc
networks, the nodes may not be willing to fully cooperate
to accomplish the overall network goals. Specifically for
the packet-forwarding problem, forwarding of other nodes’
packets consumes a node’s limited battery energy. Therefore, it
may not be in a node’s best interest to forward other’s arriving
packets. However, refusal to forward other’s packets non-
cooperatively will severely affect the network functionality
and thereby impair a node’s own performance. Hence, it is
crucial to design a mechanism to enforce cooperation for
packet forwarding among greedy and distributed nodes.
The packet-forwarding problem in ad hoc networks has been
extensively studied in the literature. The fact that nodes act
selfishly to optimize their own performance has motivated
many researchers to apply game theory [1], [2] in solving this
problem. Broadly speaking, the approaches used to encourage
packet-forwarding can be categorized into two general types.
The first type makes use of virtual payments. Pricing [3] and
credit based method [4] fall into this first type. The second
type of approach is related to personal and community en-
forcement to maintain the long-term relationship among nodes.
Cooperation is sustained because defection against one node
causes personal retaliation or sanction by others. Watchdog and
pathrater are proposed in [5] to identify misbehaving nodes
and deflect traffic around them. Reputation-based protocols are
proposed in [6] and [7]. In [8], a model is considered to show
cooperation among participating nodes. The packet forwarding
schemes using “TIT for TAT” schemes are proposed in [9].
In [10], a cartel maintenance framework is constructed for
distributed rate control for wireless networks. In [11], self-
learning repeated game approaches are constructed to enforce
cooperation and to study better cooperation. Some recent
works for game theory to enhance energy-efficient behavior
in infrastructure networks can be found in [12]–[15].
However, for packet-forwarding networks, there exists the
so-called curse of boundary nodes. The nodes at the boundary
of the network must depend on the backbone nodes in the
middle of the networks to forward their packets. On the other
hand, the backbone nodes will not depend on the boundary
nodes. As a result, the backbone nodes do not worry about
retaliation or lost reputation for not forwarding the packets
of the boundary nodes. This fact causes the curse of the
boundary nodes. In order to cure this curse, in this paper,
we propose an approach based on cooperative game coalitions
using cooperative transmission.
Recently, cooperative transmission [16] [17] has gained
considerable attention as a transmit strategy for future wireless
networks. The basic idea of cooperative transmission is that
the relay nodes can help the source node’s transmission by re-
laying a replica of the source’s information. Cooperative com-
munications efficiently takes advantage of the broadcast nature
of wireless networks, while exploiting the inherent spatial and
multiuser diversities. The energy-efficient broadcast problem
in wireless networks is considered in [18]. The work in [19]
evaluates the cooperative diversity performance when the best
relay is chosen according to the average SNR, and the outage
probability of relay selection based on instantaneous SNRs. In
[20], the authors propose a distributed relay selection scheme
that requires limited network knowledge with instantaneous
SNRs. In [21], the relay assignment problem is solved for
multiuser cooperative communications. In [22], cooperative
resource allocation for OFDM is studied. A game theoretic
approach for relay selection has been proposed in [23]. In
[24], the centralized power allocation schemes are presented
by assuming all the relay nodes helped. In [25], cooperative
routing protocols are constructed based on non-cooperative
routes.
Using cooperative transmission, boundary nodes can serve
as relays and provide some transmission benefits for the
backbone nodes that can be viewed as source nodes. In return,
the boundary nodes are rewarded for packet-forwarding. To
analyze the benefits and rewards, we investigate a game
coalition that describes how much collective payoff a set of
nodes can gain and how to divide the payoff. We investigate
the stability and payoff division using concepts such as the
core, nucleolus, and Shapley function. Two types of fairness
are defined, namely, the min-max fairness using nucleolus
and average fairness using the Shapley function. Then, we
construct a protocol using both repeated games and coalition
games. From the simulation results, we investigate how bound-
ary nodes and backbone nodes form coalitions according to
different fairness criteria. The proposed protocol can improve
the network connectivity by about 50%, compared to the pure
repeated game approach.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II, repeated
game approaches are reviewed and the curse of the boundary
nodes is explained. In Section III, the cooperative transmission
model is illustrated and the corresponding coalition games are
constructed. Stability and two types of fairness are investi-
gated. A protocol that exploits the properties of our approach
is also proposed. Simulation results are shown in Section IV
and conclusions are given in Section V.
II. REPEATED GAMES AND CURSE OF BOUNDARY NODES
A wireless packet-forwarding network can be modeled as
a directed graph G(L,A), where L is the set of all nodes
and A is the set of all directed links (i, l), i, l ∈ L. Each
node i has several transmission destinations which are included
in set Di. To reach the destination j in Di, the available
routes form a depending graph Gji whose nodes represents
the potential packet-forwarding nodes. The transmission from
node i to node j depends on a subsect of the nodes in Gji
for packet-forwarding. Notice that this dependency can be
mutual. One node depends on the other node, while the other
node can depend on this node as well. In general, this mutual
dependency is common, especially for backbone nodes at the
center of the network. In the remainder of this section, we
will discuss how to make use of this mutual dependency for
packet-forwarding using a repeated game, and then we will
explain the curse of boundary nodes.
A. Repeated Games for Mutually Dependent Nodes
A repeated game is a special type of dynamic game (a
game that is played multiple times). When the nodes interact
by playing a similar static game (which is played only once)
numerous times, the game is called a repeated game. Unlike
a static game, a repeated game allows a strategy to be
contingent on the past moves, thus allowing reputation effects
and retribution, which give possibilities for cooperation. The
game is defined as follows:
Definition 1: A T -period repeated game is a dynamic game
in which, at each period t, the moves during periods 1, . . . , t−
1 are known to every node. In such a game, the total discounted
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Fig. 1: Example of the Curse of Boundary Nodes
payoff for each node is computed by
∑T
t=1 β
t−1ui(t), where
ui(t) denotes the payoff to node i at period t and where β is a
discount factor. Note that β represents the node’s patience or
on the other hand how important the past affects the current
payoff. If T = ∞, the game is referred as an infinitely-
repeated game. The average payoff to node i is then given
by:
ui = (1 − β)
∞∑
t=1
βt−1ui(t). (1)
It is known that repeated games can be used to induce
greedy nodes in communication networks to show cooperation.
In packet-forwarding networks, if a greedy node does not
forward the packets of other nodes, it can enjoy benefits such
as power saving. However, this node will get punishment from
the other nodes in the future if it depends on the other nodes to
forward its own packets. The benefit of greediness in the short
term will be offset by the loss associated with punishment in
the future. So the nodes will rather act cooperatively if the
nodes are sufficiently patient. From the Folk theorem below,
we infer that in an infinitely repeated game, any feasible
outcome that gives each node a better payoff than the Nash
equilibrium [1], [2] can be obtained.
Theorem 1: (Folk Theorem [1], [2]) Let (uˆ1, . . . , uˆL) be the
set of payoffs from a Nash equilibrium and let (u1, . . . , uL)
be any feasible set of payoffs. There exists an equilibrium of
the infinitely repeated game that attains any feasible solution
(u1, . . . , uL) with ui ≥ uˆi, ∀i as the average payoff, provided
that β is sufficiently close to 1.
In the literature of packet-forwarding wireless networks,
the conclusion of the above Folk theorem is achieved by
several approaches. Tit-for-tat [8] [9] is proposed so that
all mutually dependent nodes have the same set of actions.
A cartel maintenance scheme [10] has closed-form optimal
solutions for both cooperation and non-cooperation. A self-
learning repeated game approach is proposed in [11] for
individual distributed nodes to study the cooperation points
and to develop protocols for maintaining them. Given the
previous attention to the problem of nodes having mutual
dependency, we will assume in this paper that the packet-
forwarding problem of selfish nodes with mutual dependency
has been solved and we will focus instead on the problems
encountered by the boundary nodes.
B. Curse of Boundary Nodes
When there is no mutual dependency, the curse of boundary
nodes occurs, an example of which is shown in Figure 1.
Suppose node 1 needs to send data to node 3, and node 2
needs to send data to node 0. Because node 1 and node 2
depend on each other for packet-forwarding, they are obliged
to do so because of the possible threat or retaliation from the
other node. However, if node 0 wants to transmit to node 2
and node 3, or node 3 tries to communicate with node 0 and
node 1, the nodes in the middle have no incentive to forward
the packets due to their greediness. Moreover, this greediness
cannot be punished in the future since the dependency is not
mutual. This problem is especially severe for the nodes on the
boundary of the networks, so it is called the curse of boundary
nodes.
On the other hand, if node 0 can form a coalition with node
1 and help node 1’s transmission (for example to reduce the
transmitted power of node 1), then node 1 has the incentive
to help node 0 transmit as a reward. A similar situation arises
for node 3 to form a coalition with node 2. We call nodes
like 1 and 2 backbone nodes, while nodes like 0 and 3 are
boundary nodes. In the following section, we will study how
coalitions can be formed to address this issue using cooperative
transmission.
III. COALITION GAMES WITH COOPERATIVE
TRANSMISSION
In this section, we first study a cooperative transmission
technique that allows nodes to participate in coalitions. Then,
we formulate a coalition game with cooperative transmission.
Furthermore, we investigate the fairness issue and propose two
types of fairness definitions. Finally, a protocol for packet-
forwarding using repeated games and coalition games is con-
structed.
A. Cooperative Transmission System Model
First, we discuss the traditional direct transmission case.
The source transmits its information to the destination with
power Pd. The received signal to noise ratio (SNR) is
Γd =
Pdhs,d
σ2
, (2)
where hs,d is the channel gain from the source to the desti-
nation and σ2 is the noise level. To achieve the minimal link
quality γ, we need for the transmitted power to be sufficiently
large so that Γd ≥ γ. The transmitted power is also upper
bounded by Pmax.
Next, we consider multiple nodes using the amplify-and-
forward protocol [16]1 to transmit in two stages as shown in
Figure 2. In stage one, the source node (denoted as node 0)
transmits its information to the destination, and due to the
broadcast nature of the wireless channels, the other nodes can
receive the information. In stage two, the remaining N relay
nodes help the source by amplifying the source signal. In both
stages, the source and the relays transmit their signals through
1Other cooperative transmission protocols can be exploited in a similar way.
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Fig. 2: Coalition Game with Cooperative Transmission
orthogonal channels using schemes like TDMA, FDMA, or
orthogonal CDMA.
In stage one, the source transmits its information and the
received signals at the destination and the relays can be written
respectively as
ys,d =
√
P0hs,dx+ ns,d, (3)
and ys,ri =
√
P0hs,rix+ ns,ri , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (4)
where P0 is the transmitted power of the source, x is the
transmitted symbol with unit power, hs,ri is the channel gain
from the source to relay i, and ns,d and ns,ri are the thermal
noise processes at the destination and relay, respectively.
Without significant loss of generality, we assume that all
thermal noises have the same power σ2.
In stage two, each relay amplifies the received signal from
the source and retransmits it to the destination. The received
signal at the destination for relay i can be written as
yri,d =
√
Pi√
P0|hs,ri |2 + σ2
hri,dys,ri + nri,d, (5)
where Pi is relay i’s transmit power, hri,d is the channel gain
from relay i to the destination, and nri,d is the thermal noise
with variance σ2.
At the destination, the signal received at stage one and the
N signals received at stage two are combined using maximal
ratio combining (MRC). The SNR at the output of MRC is
Γ = Γ0 +
N∑
i=1
Γi, (6)
where Γ0 = P0|hs,d|
2
σ2
and
Γi =
P0Pi|hs,ri |2|hri,d|2
σ2(P0|hs,ri |2 + Pi|hri,d|2 + σ2)
. (7)
On comparing (6) with (2), in order to achieve the desired
link quality γ, we can see that the required power is always
less than the direct transmission power, i.e., P0 < Pd. So
cooperation transmission can reduce the transmit power of the
source node. This fact can give incentives of mutual benefits
for the backbone nodes (acting as sources) and the boundary
nodes (acting as relays), and consequently can cure the curse
of the boundary nodes mentioned in Section II-B.
B. Coalition Game Formation for Boundary Nodes
In this subsection, we study possible coalitions between
the boundary nodes and the backbone nodes, for situations
in which the boundary nodes can help relay the information
of the backbone nodes using cooperative transmission. In the
following, we first define some basic concepts that will be
needed in our analysis.
Definition 2: A coalition S is defined to be a subset of the
total set of nodes N = {0, . . . , N}. The nodes in a coalition
want to cooperate with each other. The coalition form of a
game is given by the pair (N, v), where v is a real-valued
function, called the characteristic function. v(S) is the value of
the cooperation for coalition S with the following properties:
1) v(∅) = 0.
2) Super-additivity: if S and Z are disjoint coalitions
(S⋂Z = ∅), then v(S) + v(Z) ≤ v(S⋃Z).
The coalition states the benefit obtained from cooperation
agreements. But we still need to examine whether or not the
nodes are willing to participate in the coalition. A coalition is
called stable if no other coalition will have the incentive and
power to upset the cooperative agreement. Such division of v
is called a point in the core, which is defined by the following
definitions.
Definition 3: A payoff vector U = (U0, . . . , UN) is said
to be group rational or efficient if ∑Ni=0 Ui = v(N). A
payoff vector U is said to be individually rational if the
node can obtain the benefit no less than acting alone, i.e.
Ui ≥ v({i}), ∀i. An imputation is a payoff vector satisfying
the above two conditions.
Definition 4: An imputation U is said to be unstable
through a coalition S if v(S) >
∑
i∈S Ui, i.e., the nodes have
incentive for coalition S and upset the proposed U. The set C
of a stable imputation is called the core, i.e.,
C = {U :
∑
i∈N
Ui = v(N) and
∑
i∈S
Ui ≥ v(S), ∀S ∈ N}. (8)
In the economics literature, the core gives a reasonable set of
possible shares. A combination of shares is in the core if there
is no sub-coalition in which its members may gain a higher
total outcome than the combination of shares of concern. If
a share is not in the core, some members may be frustrated
and may think of leaving the whole group with some other
members and form a smaller group.
In the packet-forwarding network as shown in Figure 2, we
first assume one backbone node to be the source node (node
0) and the nearby boundary nodes (node 1 to node N ) to be
the relay nodes. We will discuss the case of multiple source
nodes later. If no cooperative transmission is employed, the
utilities for the source node and the relay nodes are
v({0}) = −Pd, and v({i}) = −∞, ∀i = 1, . . . , N. (9)
With cooperative transmission and a grand coalition that
includes all nodes, the utilities for the source node and the
relay nodes are
U0 = −P0 −
N∑
i=1
αiPd (10)
and Ui = −Pi
αi
, (11)
where αi is the ratio of the number of packets that the
backbone node is willing to forward for boundary node i,
to the number of packets that the boundary node i relays
for the backbone node using cooperative transmission. Here
we use negative power as the utility so as to be consistent
with the conventions used in the game theory literature.
Smaller αi means the boundary nodes have to relay more
packets before realizing the rewards of packet forwarding. The
other interpretation of the utility is as the average power per
transmission for the boundary nodes2. The following theorem
gives conditions under which the core is not empty, i.e, in
which the grand coalition is stable.
Theorem 2: The core is not empty if αi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N ,
and αi are such that U0 ≥ v({0}), i.e,
N∑
i=1
αi ≤ Pd − P0
Pd
. (12)
Proof: First, any relay node will get −∞ utility if it
leaves the coalition with the source node, so no node has
incentive to leave coalition with node 0. Then, from (6),
the inclusion of relay nodes will increase the received SNR
monotonically. So P0 will decrease monotonically with the
addition of any relay node. As a result, the source node has
the incentive to include all the relay nodes, as long as the
source power can be reduced, i.e., U0 ≥ v({0}). A grand
coalition is formed and the core is not empty if (12) holds.
The concept of the core defines the stability of a utility
allocation. However, it does not define how to allocate the
utility. For the proposed game, each relay node can obtain
different utilities by using different values of αi. In the next
two subsections, we study how to achieve min-max fairness
and average fairness.
C. Min-Max Fairness of a Game Coalition using Nucleolus
We introduce the concepts of excess, kernel, and nucleolus
[1], [2]. For a fixed characteristic function v, an imputation
U is found such that, for each coalition S and its associated
dissatisfaction, an optimal imputation is calculated to minimize
the maximum dissatisfaction. The dissatisfaction is quantified
as follows.
2Notice that we omit the transmitted power needed to send the boundary
node’s own packet to the backbone node, since it is irrelevant to the coalition.
Definition 5: The measure of dissatisfaction of an imputa-
tion U for a coalition S is defined as the excess:
e(U, S) = v(S)−
∑
j∈S
Uj . (13)
Obviously, any imputation U is in the core, if and only if all
its excesses are negative or zero.
Definition 6: A kernel of v is the set of all allocations U
such that
max
S⊆N−j,i∈S
e(U, S) = max
T⊆N−i,j∈T
e(U, T ). (14)
If nodes i and j are in the same coalition, then the highest
excess that i can make in a coalition without j is equal to the
highest excess that j can make in a coalition without i.
Definition 7: The nucleolus of a game is the allocation U
that minimizes the maximum excess:
U = argmin
U
(max e(U, S), ∀S). (15)
The nucleolus of a game has the following property: The
nucleolus of a game in coalitional form exists and is unique.
The nucleolus is group rational and individually rational. If
the core is not empty, the nucleolus is in the core and kernel.
In other word, the nucleolus is the best allocation under the
min-max criterion.
Using the above concepts, we prove the following theorem
to show the optimal αi in (10) to have min-max fairness.
Theorem 3: The maximal αi to yield the nucleolus of the
proposed coalition game is given by
αi =
Pd − P0(N)
NPd
, (16)
where P0(N) is the required transmitted power of the source
when all relays transmit with transmitted power Pmax.
Proof: Since for any coalition other than the grand
coalition, the excess will be −∞, we need only consider the
grand coalition. Suppose the min-max utility is µ for all nodes,
i.e.
µ = −Pi
αi
. (17)
From (12) and since Ui is monotonically increasing with αi
in (11), we have
αi =
Pi∑N
i=1 Pi
· (Pd − P0)
Pd
. (18)
Since P0 in (6) is a monotonically increasing function of Pi,
to achieve the maximal αi and µ, each relay transmits with
the largest possible power Pmax. Notice here we assume the
backbone node can accept arbitrarily small power gain to join
the coalition.
D. Average Fairness of Game Coalition using the Shapley
Function
The core concept defines the stability of an allocation
of payoff and the nucleolus concept quantifies the min-max
fairness of a game coalition. In this subsection, we study
another average measure of fairness for each individual using
the concept of a Shapley function [1], [2].
Definition 8: A Shapley function φ is a function that assigns
to each possible characteristic function v a vector of real
numbers, i.e.,
φ(v) = (φ0(v), φ1(v), φ2(v), . . . , φN (v)) (19)
where φi(v) represents the worth or value of node i in the
game. There are four Shapley Axioms that φ(v) must satisfy
1) Efficiency Axiom: ∑i∈N Φi(v) = v(N).
2) Symmetry Axiom: If node i and node j are such that
v(S
⋃{i}) = v(S⋃{j}) for every coalition S not
containing node i and node j, then φi(v) = φj(v).
3) Dummy Axiom: If node i is such that v(S) = v(S⋃{i})
for every coalition S not containing i, then φi(v) = 0.
4) Additivity Axiom: If u and v are characteristic functions,
then φ(u + v) = φ(v + u) = φ(u) + φ(v).
It can be proved that there exists a unique function φ
satisfying the Shapley axioms. Moreover, the Shapley function
can be calculated as
φi(v) =
∑
S⊂N−i
(|S|)!(N − |S|)!
(N + 1)!
[v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)]. (20)
Here |S| denotes the size of set S and N = {0, 1, . . .N}.
The physical meaning of the Shapley function can be
interpreted as follows. Suppose one backbone node plus N
boundary nodes form a coalition. Each node joins the coalition
in random order. So there are (N +1)! different ways that the
nodes might be ordered in joining the coalition. For any set S
that does not contain node i, there are |S|!(N −|S|)! different
ways to order the nodes so that S is the set of nodes who
enter the coalition before node i. Thus, if the various orderings
are equally likely, |S|!(N − |S|)!/(N + 1)! is the probability
that, when node i enters the coalition, the coalition of S is
already formed. When node i finds S ahead of it as it joins
the coalition, then its marginal contribution to the worth of the
coalition is v(S ∪{i})− v(S). Thus, under the assumption of
randomly-ordered joining, the Shapley function of each node is
its expected marginal contribution when it joins the coalition.
In our specific case, we consider the case in which the
backbone node is always in the coalition, and the boundary
nodes randomly join the coalition. We have v({0}) = −Pd
and
v(N) = Pd − P0(N)−
∑
i∈N
αiPd, (21)
which is the overall power saving. The problem here is how
to find a given node’s αi that satisfies the average fairness,
which is addressed by the following theorem.
Theorem 4: The maximal αi that satisfies the average fair-
ness with the physical meaning of the Shapley function is
given by
αi =
P si
Pd
, (22)
where P si is the average power saving with random entering
orders, which is defined as
P si =
1
N
[Pd − P0({i})]
+
∑N
j=1,j 6=i[P0({j})− P0({i, j})]
N(N − 1) + · · · . (23)
Proof: The maximal αi is solved by the following
equations: {
αi
αj
= φi
φj
,
v(N) ≥ 0. (24)
The first equation in (24) is the average fairness according to
the Shapley function, and the second equation in (24) is the
condition for a non-empty core. Similar to min-max fairness,
we assume that the backbone node can accept arbitrarily small
power gain to join the coalition.
If boundary node i is the first to join the coalition, the
marginal contribution for power saving is 1
N
[Pd − P0({i})−
αiPd], where 1N is the probability. If boundary node i is
the second to join the coalition, the marginal contribution
is
PN
j=1,j 6=i[P0({j})+αjPd−P0({i,j})−(αi+αj)Pd]
N(N−1) . By means of
some simple derivations, we can obtain the Shapley function
φi as
φi = −αiPd + 1
N
[Pd − P0({i})] (25)
+
∑N
j=1,j 6=i[P0({j})− P0({i, j})]
N(N − 1) + · · · ,
and then we can obtain
αi =
[Pd − P0(N)]P si
Pd
∑N
j=1 P
s
j
. (26)
Since
Pd − P0(N) =
N∑
j=1
P sj , (27)
we prove (22).
Notice that different nodes have different values of P si , due
to their channel conditions and abilities to reduce the backbone
node’s power. Compared with the min-max fairness in the
previous subsection, the average fairness using the Shapley
function gives different nodes different values of αi according
to their locations.
E. Joint Repeated-Game and Coalition-Game Packet-
Forwarding Protocol
Using the above analysis, we now develop a packet-
forwarding protocol based on repeated games and coalition
games based on the following steps.
Packet-Forwarding Protocol using Repeated Games and
Coalition Games
1) Route discovery for all nodes.
2) Packet-forwarding enforcement for the backbone nodes,
using threat of future punishment in the repeated games.
3) Neighbor discovery for the boundary nodes.
4) Coalition game formation.
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5) Packet relay for the backbone nodes with cooperative
transmission.
6) Transmission of the boundary nodes’ own packets to the
backbone nodes for forwarding.
First, all nodes in the network undergo route discovery.
Then each node knows who depends on it and on whom it
depends for transmission. Using this route information, the
repeated games can be formulated for the backbone nodes.
The backbone nodes forward the other nodes’ information
because of the threat of future punishment if these packets
are not forwarded. Due to the network topology, some nodes’
transmissions depend on the others while the others do not
depend on these nodes. These nodes are most often located
at the boundary of the network. In the next step, these
boundary nodes try to find their neighboring backbone nodes.
Then, the boundary nodes try to form coalitions with the
backbone nodes, so that the boundary nodes can be rewarded
for transmitting their own packets. Cooperative transmission
gives an opportunity for the boundary nodes to pay some
“credits” first to the backbone nodes for the rewards of packet-
forwarding in return. On the other hand, competition among
the backbone nodes prevents the boundary nodes from being
forced to accept the minimal payoffs.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We model all channels as additive white Gaussian noise
channels having a propagation factor of 3; that is, power falls
off spatially according to an inverse-cubic law. The maximal
transmitted power is 10dbmW and the thermal noise level is
-60dbmW. The minimal SNR γ is 10dB. In the first setup,
we assume the backbone node is located at (0m, 0m), and the
destination is located at either (100m, 0m) or (50m, 0m). The
boundary nodes are located on an arc with angles randomly
distributed from 0.5pi to 1.5pi and with distances varying from
5m to 100m.
In Figure 3, we study the min-max fairness and show the
average αi over 1000 iterations as a function of distance from
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the relays to the source node. Due to the min-max nature,
all boundary nodes have the same αi. When the distance is
small, i.e., when the relays are located close to the source, αi
approaches 1
N
. This is because the relays can serve as a virtual
antenna for the source, and the source needs very low power
for transmission to the relays. When the distance is large, the
relays are less effective and αi decreases, which means that the
relays must transmit more packets for the source to earn the
rewards of packet-forwarding. When the destination is located
at 50m, the source-destination channel is better than that at
100m. When N = 1 and the source-destination distance is
50m, the relays close to the source have larger αi and the
relays farther away have lower αi than that in the 100m case.
In Figure 4, we show the corresponding P0 for the backbone
node. We can see that P0 increases when the distances between
the boundary nodes to the backbone node increase.
If we consider the multiple backbone (multiple core) case
with min-max fairness, Figure 3 and Figure 4 provide the
boundary nodes a guideline for selecting a backbone node
with which to form a coalition. First, a less crowded coalition
is preferred. Second, the nearest backbone node is preferred.
Third, for N = 1, if the source-destination channel is good,
the closer backbone node is preferred; otherwise, the farther
one can provide larger αi.
Next, we investigate the average fairness using the Shapley
function. The simulation setup is as follows. The backbone
node is located at (0m, 0m) and the destination is located
at (−50m, 0m). Boundary node 1 is located at (20m, 0m)
and (50m, 0m), respectively. Boundary node 2 moves from
(5m, 0m) to (100m, 0m). The remaining simulation parame-
ters are the same. In Figure 5, we show maximal αi for two
boundary nodes. We can see that when boundary node 2 is
closer to the backbone node than boundary node 1, α2 >
α1, i.e., boundary node 2 can help relay fewer packets for
backbone node 1 before being rewarded. The two curves for
α1 and α2 for the same boundary node 1 location cross at the
boundary node 1 location. The figure shows that the average
fairness using the Shapley function gives greater rewards to
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the boundary node whose channel is better and who can
help the backbone node more. When boundary node 2 moves
from (20m, 0m) to (50m, 0m), α1 becomes smaller, but α2
becomes larger. This is because the backbone node must
depend on boundary node 2 more for relaying. However, the
backbone node will pay less for the boundary nodes. Notice
that αi at the crossover point is lower. This is because the
overall power for the backbone node is high when boundary
node 2 is far away, as shown in Figure 4.
Finally, we examine the degree to which the coalition game
can improve the network connectivity. Here we define the
network connectivity as the probability that a randomly located
node can connect to the other nodes. All nodes are randomly
located within a square of size B×B. In Figure 7, we show the
network un-connectivity as a function of B for the numbers
of nodes equal to 100 and 500. With increasing network
size, the node density becomes lower, and more and more
nodes are located at the boundary and must depend on the
others for packet-forwarding. If no coalition game is formed,
these boundary nodes cannot transmit their packets due to the
selfishness of the other nodes. With the coalition game, the
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network connectivity can be improved by about 50%. The
only chance that a node cannot connect to the other nodes is
when this node is located too far away from any other node.
We can see that the game coalition cures the curse of the
boundary nodes in wireless packet-forwarding networks with
selfish nodes.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a coalition game ap-
proach to provide benefits to selfish nodes in wireless packet-
forwarding networks using cooperative transmission, so that
the boundary nodes can transmit their packets effectively.
We have used the concepts of coalition games to maintain
stable and fair game coalitions. Specifically, we have studied
two fairness concepts: min-max fairness and average fairness.
A protocol has been constructed using repeated games and
coalition games. From simulation results, we have seen how
boundary nodes and backbone nodes form coalitions according
to different fairness criteria. We can also see that network
connectivity can be improved by about 50%, compared to the
pure repeated game approach.
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